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Neurosurgical interventions for psychiatric disorders have a long and troubled history 
(1, 2) but have become much more refined in the last few decades due to the rapid 
development of neuroimaging and robotic technologies (2). These advances have 
enabled the design of less invasive techniques, which are more focused, such as deep 
brain stimulation (DBS) (3). DBS involves electrode insertion into specific neural targets 
implicated in pathological behavior, which are then repeatedly stimulated at adjustable 
frequencies. DBS has been used for Parkinson’s disease and movement disorders since 
the 1960s (4–6) and over the last decade has been applied to treatment-refractory 
psychiatric disorders, with some evidence of benefit in obsessive–compulsive disorder 
(OCD), major depressive disorder, and addictions (7). Recent consensus guidelines on 
best practice in psychiatric neurosurgery (8) stress, however, that DBS for psychiatric 
disorders remains at an experimental and exploratory stage. The ethics of DBS—in par-
ticular for psychiatric conditions—is debated (1, 8–10). Much of this discourse surrounds 
the philosophical implications of competence, authenticity, personality, or identity change 
following neurosurgical interventions, but there is a paucity of applied guidance on neu-
roethical best practice in psychiatric DBS, and health-care professionals have expressed 
that they require more (11). This paper aims to redress this balance by providing a practi-
cal, applied neuroethical gold standard framework to guide research ethics committees, 
researchers, and institutional sponsors. We will describe this as applied to our protocol 
for a particular research trial of DBS in severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SE-AN) 
(https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01924598, unique identifier NCT01924598), but 
believe it may have wider application to DBS in other psychiatric disorders.
Keywords: anorexia nervosa, deep brain stimulation, capacity, patient advocacy, neuroethics, clinical trial, 
neuromodulation
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BaCKGrOUnD
Anorexia nervosa (AN) has the highest mortality rate of any 
psychiatric disorder and remains one of the most challenging 
psychiatric disorders to treat (12, 13). The illness has peak onset 
in adolescence and is associated with dramatically elevated sui-
cide rates (14), long- and short-term incapacity, and impaired of 
quality of life (15–17), leading to huge morbidity costs to health 
services and individuals (18). There is a grave paucity of effec-
tive, evidence-based treatments (19–21) and no pharmacological 
treatments of clear benefit (20–22). Accumulating evidence of 
conceptual, behavioral, and neural parallels between AN and 
other “compulsive” psychopathologies (such as obsessive com-
pulsive disorder and addictions) raises the question of whether 
the compulsive features characteristic of AN (23–26) might 
respond to deep brain stimulation (DBS) (25, 27–29), in a similar 
manner to the improvements noted in DBS for OCD (30). Given 
the shortcomings of current treatments, an increasing number 
of centers internationally are interested in developing DBS for 
AN, but it remains an experimental treatment (31, 32) as there 
are only a few published case reports or series and no controlled 
studies (33–38).
The application of DBS to individuals with severe and endur-
ing anorexia nervosa (SE-AN) raises particular ethical chal-
lenges (39–43), many of which are exacerbated by an invasive 
experimental intervention on the brain. In particular, issues 
of autonomy and capacity to consent arise because of the ego 
syntonicity of symptoms—whereby sufferers often experience 
the disorder as part of their identity—alongside their apparently 
paradoxical refusal to engage in life-saving activities (proper 
nutrition) while claiming a desire to live (1, 9, 44–46). As a 
result, “compulsory treatment”—which can be controversial—is 
sometimes employed in clinical practice in order to reduce harm 
from AN or to save life. Recent legal cases in the UK, and the 
successful use of guardianship orders in Australia, indicate that 
judges consider that patients with severe and enduring AN can 
lack mental capacity to make treatment decisions about their 
eating disorder, although they are usually found at the same time 
to possess capacity to make other unrelated decisions. This raises 
serious questions about the mental capacity of these patients 
to consent to experimental treatment research into their eating 
disorder (47–51).
Furthermore, DBS is an invasive brain procedure, and applied 
to SE-AN it is particularly medically high risk and experimen-
tal, with a lack of consensus about optimal neural targets, an 
increased risk of surgical complications due to severe chronic 
malnutrition, and a risk of non-compliance due to patients’ 
ambivalence about recovery (39–43). The risk–benefit calcula-
tion fundamental to medical ethics is difficult to make, due to 
the lack of an evidence base: a few published reports in uncon-
trolled case series suggest benefit in up to half of individuals 
with SE-AN undergoing DBS (33–38), but there is also evidence 
of harm (34)—albeit arguably insufficient to violate the principle 
of clinical equipoise. However, if the criteria for mental capacity 
and fully informed consent can be met, and in light of the lack 
of effective treatments for SE-AN, it can be considered ethically 
justified to pursue further research into DBS as a potential treat-
ment for SE-AN (18).
In the face of this complexity, we describe a framework of 
considerations to counter the ethical challenges facing research-
ers who conduct DBS in SE-AN (Table 1). While our focus is DBS 
in SE-AN (52), this framework also has implications for other 
neuropsychiatric conditions and so is likely to have some wider 
application.
In this paper, we detail the paradigm and gold standard 
framework, and go on to outline the practical application of the 
framework, suggesting how it should be used to guide clinical 
research practice.
THE OXFOrD nEUrOETHiCS ParaDiGM 
anD GUiDinG FraMEWOrK FOr DBS
The Oxford neuroethics research 
Paradigm for DBS
The Oxford Neuroethics research paradigm was created to 
support and complement the first UK-registered pilot study of 
DBS for AN (https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01924598, 
unique identifier NCT01924598), cleared by the Oxford A REC 
(13/SC/0267). It consists of an ethical sub-study alongside checks 
and balances at all stages, supported by an independent ethicist 
who is also an eating disorder psychiatrist. Both the paradigm 
(Figure  1) and the framework derived from it (detailed in 
Table 1) are guided by the foundational principles of the Nuffield 
Council of Bioethics report on “Intervening in the Brain” (53) 
(detailed in Table 2) (54).
The paradigm was developed for five distinct reasons:
 1. to acknowledge and position ethical considerations centrally 
within research;
 2. to increase the protection of and advocacy for participants;
 3. to provide independent guidance to researchers on ethical 
issues;
 4. to better understand the ethical issues (based on the realities 
of conducting such research);
 5. to inform and advance ethical discourse and practice sur-
rounding neuromodulation in severe enduring psychiatric 
disorders (in particular, SE-AN).
Ethical safeguards were integrated into the protocol from the 
outset and an independent ethical consultant subcontracted to 
the project from a different university. Additionally, an ethics 
sub-study exploring the ramifications of DBS for SE-AN was 
embedded within the main study protocol from inception. Such 
a sub-study is recommended by recent consensus guidelines on 
neurosurgical approaches to psychiatric disorders (8); however, 
it is not present (to our knowledge) in any other psychiatric 
DBS research trials worldwide. The inclusion of an independent 
clinician–ethicist allows for mental capacity and consent to be 
considered both from a clinical and a philosophical point of view, 
and the independence of the clinician–ethicist allows decisions to 
be made that are not at risk of being influenced by the interests of 
TaBlE 1 | The Oxford neuroethics Gold Standard Framework for deep brain stimulation (DBS) in anorexia nervosa (an).
 1. Assess individual need and possible risk and benefit
 a. Given the speculative nature of DBS for severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SE-AN), will the researchers fully assess the duration of disorder and what 
previous treatment potential participants have had, and whether there are any conventional treatment options as yet untried?
 b. What is the physical and mental status (including comorbid medical and psychiatric conditions) of the potential participants and the level of risk involved in 
participation in the research? How will the researchers assess these risks? What exclusion criteria will the researchers use (and what criteria for preoperative 
physical status will they use) to minimize risk while not excluding all potential participants?
 2. Consider issues of mental capacity and informed consent
 a. Is it acknowledged that mental capacity can be impaired in SE-AN patients and will potential participants be properly assessed for capacity to consent to the 
research? The researchers must acknowledge this is a particular issue and outline their approach to the issue, as only participants with full capacity should be 
taking part in this type of novel research.
 b. Who is assessing the capacity to consent to research? Ideally this should be an independent ethicist with clinical training in the disorder of interest, or an 
appropriately trained independent clinician and an independent ethicist working together. It may not be appropriate for the research trial staff to be assessing 
capacity.
 c. What measures or criteria are the assessors using to assess mental capacity to take part in research, bearing in mind mental incapacity can be subtle in this 
patient group? It should also be borne in mind that some individuals with SE-AN are thought to have capacity in all areas except those relating to the treatment of 
their disorder.
 d. Consider whether impairments of capacity specific to the disorder are present—for AN researchers should assess:
i.  Insight and appreciation of the disorder and its impact on oneself;
ii.  Identity as relating to AN and how this affects decisions regarding treatment and prospect of recovery, for example, what would their identity be without AN;
iii. Value systems consistent to AN and how they affect decisions in question;
iv. Whether the person feels able to choose to recover or to decide against the impulses of the AN;
v.  Whether the person can act against the impulses or compulsions of AN;
vi. Ambivalence toward treatment or recovery and the ability to form and maintain a settled decision.
 e. How would the researchers ensure fully informed and fully voluntary consent? The researchers should acknowledge the likelihood that potential participants, their 
families, and their clinicians may feel desperate to try what is usually a last-line treatment strategy.
 3. Consider methods of participant support and advocacy during research participation
 a. What independent support will the researchers provide the participants to support and advocate for them in situations of distress, anxiety, or difficulties?
 b. Will the researchers assess the living arrangements and consider postoperative safety and support of participants?
 c. Will the families and partners of participants be involved in supporting participants, and how much will they be informed about the nature and consequences of 
the trial?
 d. Will the research team have an identified contact, such as a surgical research nurse, who can be easily contacted to provide practical advice?
 e. Are the surgical and anesthetic teams fully conversant with the needs of SE-AN patients and will the surgical wards be able to support them appropriately during 
admission, for example, with their eating and dietary needs, and managing compulsive exercise?
 f. What are the arrangements for surgical and anesthetic teams, who are usually not used to working with mental health teams, to cowork with the research 
psychiatrists and participants’ usual mental health professionals?
 g. What liaison arrangements are in place for the research team to work with the participants’ usual treating mental health clinicians, especially if the participants are 
traveling long distances for the research?
 4. Consider future care after research participation
 a. What are the arrangements for neurosurgical DBS support into the future after the end of the research project, if the participants elect to continue having their 
DBS equipment in situ?
 b. What are the arrangements for handing back psychiatric care after end of research?
 5. Ethical reflection and support
 a. What mechanism will the research team use to reflect on their ethical difficulties?
 b. How will the research team learn from their experiences?
 6. Consider future public interest in equity of access to the products of any innovation arising from the research
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the research over the needs of the patient. The ethics component 
of the main study and the ethics research sub-study is depicted 
in schematic form in Figure 1 and can also be found by going 
to the registered trial online: https://clinicaltrials.gov/show/
NCT01924598.
The Oxford neuroethics Gold Standard 
Framework for DBS in an
Derived from this research paradigm, we recommend the 
framework outlined in Table  1 to Institutional Review Boards 
or Research Ethics Committees considering proposals of DBS 
research in SE-AN. We expect that often, a clinically qualified 
ethicist with appropriate expertise in the disorder is not available 
(see point 2b within Table 1 on the assessment of capacity). In 
these cases, we would recommend that an independent ethicist 
should work together with an independent clinician, particularly 
in the assessment of capacity, to ensure that both clinical and 
ethical inputs are maintained.
aPPliCaTiOn OF THE OXFOrD 
nEUrOETHiCS FraMEWOrK FOr DBS
assess individual need and Possible risk 
and Benefit
Deep brain stimulation research into severe and enduring 
psychiatric disorders evokes an inevitable tension between the 
desperation experienced by individuals with chronic and debili-
tating illness and uncertainty about the safety and the efficacy of 
FiGUrE 1 | Diagram of deep brain stimulation (DBS) clinical trial for severe and enduring anorexia nervosa, focusing on the ethical components of 
this study. This includes both the ethics sub-study and the checks and balances in the overall protocol.
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DBS in relieving symptoms. This tension can also be considered 
in terms of the risks and the benefits of DBS for each individual.
Medical Risk to Patients
Those with SE-AN are a risky group to perform surgical proce-
dures on, as they have (by definition) chronic malnutrition, very 
poor physical and mental health, and low quality of life and often 
require recurrent hospitalizations to stabilize them medically. 
Both the chronic malnourishment and subsequent micronutri-
ent deficiencies present a challenge to anesthetic and surgical 
intervention and postoperative wound healing. Neurosurgery 
can result in epileptic seizures, strokes, and even in rare cases 
death. In the reported trials of DBS in SE-AN, seizures have been 
reported in some of the participants (43).
Longer Term Risk of Harms
It is also worth considering other less surgical “side effects” that 
may result, which can range from neurological effects, to mood 
changes, to personality changes. The concept of “personality” in 
the face of longstanding chronic illness is complex, as such illness 
may cloud or color personality function. Notably, some changes 
in personality function may be seen as a goal of treatment, not a 
negative outcome of it (8)—but other changes may have a nega-
tive effects on relationships and quality of life due to difficulty 
in transitioning from the role of a patient, adjusting to better 
psychosocial function with its attendant changes, and a grief for 
valued aspects or functional purposes (for example, as a safety or 
coping mechanism) of the illness (10, 55–57).
The Benefit of Recovery from AN
The benefits of recovering to any extent from AN are maximal: 
few treatments are considered efficacious in SE-AN (20, 21), 
while the costs of illness to the individual and their surrounding 
system are great. The potential for DBS to ameliorate any of this 
suffering is perceived as a huge benefit within both the patient 
population and the clinical community, though notably they may 
TaBlE 2 | an abridged version of The nuffield Council of Bioethics 
Ethical Framework for neurotechnology, which we used to inform our 
Framework (54).
Foundational principles:
• Tension between need and uncertainty;
• Need: suffering caused by disorders and absence of effective treatments;
• Uncertainty: novelty of neurotechnology and lack of knowledge of 
mechanisms;
• The special status of the brain as the organ that gives rise to a sense of self 
and identity: caution against uncertain effects on personality or sense of self;
• The special status of the brain as the organ that gives rise to a sense of self 
and identity: beneficence: The importance of autonomy and dignity-promoting 
interventions in brain-based disorders.
6 interests that warrant particular attention:
• Protection against the potential safety risks of interventions;
• Unintended impacts on privacy;
• Promotion of autonomy;
• Public interest in equity of access to the products of innovation;
• Prevention of stigma;
• Protecting and promoting public understanding and trust in novel 
neurotechnologies.
3 virtues guiding research in novel neurotechnologies:
• Inventiveness, which may be exercised through technological innovation 
and by identifying ways to provide wider access to therapies (amongst other 
things);
• Humility, which entails acknowledging the limits of current knowledge and 
of our capacities to use technologies to alleviate the harms of psychiatric 
disorders; and
• Responsibility, e.g., pursuit of robust research practices and refraining from 
exaggerated or premature claims for these technologies.
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overestimate this potential benefit. This issue will be discussed 
further in Section “Informed Consent and Desperation in a 
Clinical Trial.”
Etiological Uncertainties
There is a high level of uncertainty concerning the appropriate 
target for DBS in SE-AN, as the neural basis of the psychopathol-
ogy remains poorly understood (18). Many neural circuits have 
been implicated in or speculated upon as contributing to eating 
disorders (58)—notably those underpinning compulsivity (25) 
and mood dysregulation (34, 43). Abnormal reward processing 
and compulsivity in AN implicate striatal targets such as the 
nucleus accumbens (59)—a DBS target for addictions and OCD 
(60), while mood dysregulation and dysphoria suggest DBS tar-
gets used in depression, such as the subcallosal cingulate (18, 34, 
61). At this stage, it remains unclear which—if any—DBS neural 
target will provide optimal results with minimal risks in AN, or 
indeed, whether different areas will provide different benefits for 
different patients.
Outcome Uncertainties
As psychiatric disorders are based on complex neural circuitry 
and interactions with psychosocial factors, any symptomatic 
change is unlikely to be as dramatic as documented with move-
ment disorders. In contrast to the sudden improvements in 
symptoms in Parkinson’s, in those AN patients who respond to 
DBS of the subcallosal cingulate (34), improvement is gradual 
and indirect: improved mood regulation appears to enable 
reduction in ED symptoms such as binge purging, and subse-
quent reengagement in treatment programs that have previously 
been unsuccessful (34). It is less clear what the time course of 
response to compulsivity/reward processing targets such as the 
nucleus accumbens would be (18); one clue is that  in treatment-
resistant OCD, DBS to the nucleus accumbens, similarly to DBS 
of the subcallosal singulate, appears to allow CBT to become 
effective (30).
It is of key importance to consider with patients the renewal of 
desperation or the disappointment, which may result from no or 
minimal improvement in AN symptoms after DBS (9, 44, 62–64), 
and to stress that DBS should not be considered as a stand-alone 
“miracle cure,” but rather an intervention that might facilitate 
response to other treatment modalities such as psychotherapies 
and weight restoration programs—which may not have been pre-
viously tolerated or effective. Discussion in the section “Informed 
Consent and Desperation in a Clinical Trial” of the therapeutic 
misconception draws strongly on the discussion of the uncertain-
ties in this section and the previous one.
Necessary Safeguards
Given these complex potential risks and benefits, in order to reduce 
the surgical and psychological risks to potential participants it 
is thus crucial to assess suitability by exploring each individual’s 
deeper understanding, motivation, desires, and reality testing, as 
well as prior and recent personality functioning, and physical and 
mental state.
Strong safeguards in the protocol regarding potential safety 
risks are essential, including continuous critical examination 
of unanticipated or unknown safety risks. All potential par-
ticipants should be carefully screened for their suitability. Given 
operative risks in medically unstable and severely malnourished 
individuals, a body mass index over 13 with physical parameters 
held relatively stable is recommended. Careful monitoring of 
participants’ physical and psychological health should take place 
throughout the study, with psychiatric-neurosurgical follow-up 
offered beyond the protocol period if the individual opts to keep 
DBS in situ. Participants should receive care from the neuropsy-
chiatric/neurosurgical team in addition and in collaboration with 
their normal clinical treatment team.
Safety considerations necessitate platforms that enable quick, 
transparent, and accurate communication, as well as transfer 
of relevant data between these teams. Carers and family must 
be supported, recognizing that unpredictable risks of the DBS 
procedure are endemic to the SE-AN population, due to the con-
sequences of severe starvation and AN-related behaviors (such as 
binging and purging), and also from consequences of comorbid 
psychiatric disorders (65).
Consider issues of Mental Capacity and 
informed Consent
Competence to Consent to Research in AN
It is important to consider that those with SE-AN may have 
impaired mental capacity, and especially that while they may have 
an intact intellect, it might be considered that they are not capable 
of making decisions about their disorder, or be competent to (66). 
TaBlE 3 | Format for the assessment of capacity in eating disorders, including how one might assess capacity within the context of an intervention.
1. Assess ability to understand and retain 
information
Checking understanding and retention is fairly straightforward—disclosure can be followed by a request for the 
patient to repeat the information back in his or her own words. The MacCAT-T clinical competence instrument 
provides a structured and systematic framework for doing this (71). There is a version specifically for competence to 
consent to research, the MacCAT-CR (70).
2. Assess ability to use information This can be assessed in the course of the discussion and by asking the patient for his/her reasons for the 
decision—it should become evident whether the patient is able to use the information provided.
3. Assess appreciation of information and facts of 
the decision
Appreciation, not seen in UK legislation but found in Grisso and Appelbaum’s definition of competence, is the ability 
to apply the information to oneself (71). This can be a problem in eating disorders, for example, a patient may say, 
“I understand that’s the definition of an eating disorder, I understand I have those features, and I understand eating 
disorders need treatment; but I do NOT have an eating disorder and therefore I do not need treatment.” This clearly 
would affect capacity to make decisions about treatment for an eating disorder.
4. Assess presence of compulsion Look for compulsions (or obsessions) that may prevent the patient from acting on the basis of his/her understanding 
or even desires. The Code of Practice of the Mental Capacity Act gives an example that patients with anorexia 
nervosa (AN) may be unable to “use and weigh” treatment information as part of the decision-making process: “For 
example, a person with the eating disorder AN may understand information about the consequences of not eating. 
But their compulsion not to eat might be too strong for them to ignore” (72).
5. Assess for changes in values due to the eating 
disorder
It is part of the core criteria of AN that a person should either have a fear of fatness, or an overvaluing or pursuit 
of thinness (73). This dread of fatness and overvaluing of thinness, found in many eating disorders, means that 
being thin or losing weight becomes disproportionately highly valued by sufferers, in some cases this is even valued 
above life itself. This disproportionate value can drive some patients to decide, even after they have weighed up the 
options, not to have treatment because they would rather die than gain weight (66).
6. Assess for changes in identity due to the 
disorder
One of the characteristics of eating disorders is that they can be ego-syntonic, that is, the disorder is experienced 
as part of the self and also consistent with one’s own values (57). Further, many people with eating disorders 
become ill as adolescents and may as adults have little or no sense of who they would be without the disorder. This 
intertwining of the disorder with the sense of self can make it difficult to decide to have treatment in order to recover 
from it; for example, patients may be either unable to envisage a self without eating disorders (66).
7. Assess for depressive features, loss of hope, 
and affective elements
Eating disorders have clear effects on emotion and mood; there is a high rate of comorbidity of depression (74). 
It is important to assess for depressive features and particularly for suicidality, more covert wishes for death (for 
example, wanting to die thin) and inability to envisage or hope for recovery, all of which would affect how options are 
weighed. Charland and colleagues further argue that beyond comorbid depressive disorder, AN itself may have clear 
affective components, fitting Ribot’s conception of a “passion” in its very nature (75). These components include 
having a fixed focus and motivational force and attachment; these may have an impact on decision-making.
This touches on issues such as compulsion, depression, and changes in values due to the eating disorder.
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This has also been recognized in legal cases in recent years 
(49–51). Therefore, competence to give consent to research needs 
to be properly and independently assessed, using suitable tools. 
Research suggests that competence can be impaired in several 
ways: people who have AN may feel that the disorder is part of 
their identity; they may adopt the values of AN so that, for exam-
ple, being thin is more important than life itself; they may find 
themselves unable to make a choice to recover from the disorder 
even if they wish to; and they may find themselves unable to act 
upon the choices that they make (66–69). A structured approach 
of in-depth assessment of capacity in an eating disorder is pro-
vided in Table 3. We recommend using a standard tool such as 
the MacCAT-CR, followed by an in-depth exploration of motiva-
tions, hopes, and expectations (70).
Informed Consent and Desperation in a Clinical Trial
It is important that full and graphic information and education 
about the purpose of the clinical trial is given to each patient, 
leading to fully informed, voluntary consent. Consent, even if it 
is without coercion and fully informed, may be constrained in 
terms of lack of alternative choices (63). In this context of “last-
line” treatment research, with the attendant desperation and lack 
of choice, it may prove impossible to avoid all misinterpretations, 
leading to inadequate consent (45). Desperate patients may also 
lack the critical faculties to properly interpret what they read in 
the media about DBS, or misinterpret the nature of the trial (45). 
It is thus essential to stress that in such experimental treatment 
research, there can be no guarantee that a patient will benefit. 
Rather, it is expected that more general benefits will accrue, such 
as an improvement in knowledge, or future treatment options. 
Fully informed consent must involve the recognition of these 
nuances and the discussion of how DBS should not be regarded as 
a “miracle cure.” Researchers must engage in complex discussions 
with prospective participants about the current situation regard-
ing evidence for DBS, particularly the etiological and outcome 
uncertainties outlined previously. This is because a failure to 
appreciate this would almost certainly lead to difficulty in appre-
ciating the underlying principle of equipoise, which governs the 
ethical approval of clinical research employing DBS. Without this 
complex understanding, it would be difficult to safely judge that 
7Park et al. Oxford Neuroethics Gold Standard Framework
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potential participants do indeed possess the capacity to consent 
to the research. The main risk is “Therapeutic Misconception,” 
a misapprehension that the research clinicians are performing 
the procedure with the expectation of benefit to the individual 
(76, 77).
Even with a full understanding of the primary purpose of 
research as not for personal benefit, the uncertainties involved, 
and the risk of harm without benefit, patients who feel they have 
no other options available to them may be highly motivated to 
commit to high risk for even low chances of recovery, leaving them 
vulnerable to exploitation. The extent to which patients perceive 
benefit from this experimental treatment is further illustrated in 
patients’ pursuit of these novel treatments. Anecdotal evidence 
from DBS researchers suggests that families and patients often 
proactively ask for the opportunity to take part in experimental 
research. Some patients show commitment to involvement to the 
extent that they gain weight in order to participate in research, 
even when previously weight gain appeared impossible. Others 
have offered to relocate or travel regularly across the country 
or internationally in order to be able to take part in DBS trials 
(personal communications and our experience).
Consider Methods of Participant Support 
and advocacy during research 
Participation
Patient Advocacy and Support
The integration of an independent ethicist from an external insti-
tution allows the participants to have external support, and also 
these ethicists may act as advocates for carers and families. The 
provision of an independent clinician and/or ethicist also ensures 
that patient feedback can be integrated into decision-making and 
provides both researchers and participants with opportunities to 
obtain support, advice, and a third-party opinion.
Returning Home: Living Environment
After DBS treatment, patients will have to return home and con-
tinue with their normal lives. The living environment and recov-
ery of participants must be considered; they should be placed in 
an environment that is conducive to healing, is supportive, and 
where help is available. The environment should, if possible, not 
be one that is triggering to their eating disorder, and ability to 
contact other family members and clinical teams must be consid-
ered. Additionally, proximity to hospitals or medical care should 
also be discussed, especially in the early stages of healing.
Family Involvement
It is also necessary to consider to what extent families will act 
as carers or supports for the participant and to discuss with the 
participant how they will be involved and what they should be 
informed of. At a minimum, they should be informed of risks and 
symptoms to watch out for during the recovery period, such as 
rapid mood changes (mania or depression) or signs of infection or 
poor healing. Furthermore, medical aftercare must be considered 
before the procedure begins—a clear path for participants or their 
families to follow if participants experience any negative effects 
or have any medical concerns must be developed. It should also 
be borne in mind that it is highly likely that families, along with 
patients, are likely to be desperate for improvement and may be 
as susceptible to the “therapeutic misconception” and suffer from 
dashed hopes as much as their loved ones.
Surgical Teams and AN Patients
Consider also that patients who have DBS must be admitted to 
neurosurgical wards where staff may be unused to dealing with 
patients with severe psychiatric disorders. Psychiatric patients 
tend to get poorer care from, or be stigmatized by, health profes-
sionals in general medical and surgical settings (78), who may 
misunderstand their difficulties with eating, or see their illness as 
self-induced (79). Psychiatric liaison, support, and training of the 
neurosurgical teams involved are thus crucial. Once a patient is 
deemed postoperatively stable by the neurosurgical team, it may 
be beneficial to admit them to a specialized medical-psychiatric 
unit, if available, to mitigate this difficulty.
Privacy
Protection of privacy is paramount in all patients, but patients 
participating in research on DBS for SE-AN may be at unusual 
risk of privacy violations for a number of reasons. The overall 
number of patients undergoing this treatment in any country is 
very small, and the clinics pursuing research on DBS in SE-AN 
will be easily identifiable. Anorexic DBS patients are also visible 
to the public in a prosaic way as a consequence of their severe 
AN, in combination with the visibility of DBS apparatus in situ. 
Moreover, there is a high level of media interest in DBS in AN. The 
UK media has already exploited the “news value” of DBS in SE-AN 
with a significant degree of bias (80). Thus, patients’ identities are 
easily revealed either deliberately through media investigation, or 
inadvertently through their social circles. Participants who have 
identified themselves (34, 81) may subsequently find continued 
public scrutiny intrusive or burdensome, or individuals may be 
identified without their consent and subjected to scrutiny that 
they are not prepared to cope with. The high potential for privacy 
violations for this patient population requires research teams to 
take great care when publicizing their research, particularly in the 
media, but also more generally on university web platforms and 
in the community. The potential for these privacy violations to 
lead to stigmatizing the individual is also high, and participants 
must be informed of the possibility of this and be supported 
through any such occurrences.
Consider Future Care after research 
Participation
There are long-term care considerations and cost implications in 
experimental treatment research into DBS, due to requirements 
for lifelong neurosurgical follow-up and device maintenance. It 
would be ethically dubious, given the high costs of AN, to submit 
an individual to DBS insertion and its risks only to remove it 
after the end of a study protocol period if the individual had 
experienced benefit. It is thus essential that long-term, post-
protocol arrangements are specified. For patients with SE-AN 
who may only be in their 20s or 30s at the time of surgery, there is 
potentially a requirement for half a century or more of follow-up 
and maintenance care. This demands a health-care system that is 
able to absorb the cost of DBS follow-up as part of the “routine 
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medical care” of the patient; an issue that is likely to be prob-
lematic in countries where health-care is either privately funded, 
insurance-based, or over-stretched, or where patients may return 
or migrate to countries that cannot support appropriate aftercare. 
These questions should be considered before any trial is begun, 
and the appropriate agreements should be sought.
Once participants have returned home, it is necessary that 
their psychiatric care continues. Even if they receive benefit from 
DBS, it is highly possible that there will be adjustment problems, 
as has been seen in Parkinson’s disorder. This is known as the 
“burden of normality,” and results from the “best case scenario”—
a participant receives benefit from DBS (82). Psychiatric support 
is needed up until the point where the participant can resume 
normal life and to ensure that improvement persists and that 
adjustment is smooth. If no benefit has accrued, then there may 
be deep devastation and loss of hope, especially if participants saw 
DBS as a “last-line” treatment. Therefore, long-term psychiatric 
care arrangements must not be overlooked and are of crucial 
importance.
Ethical reflection and Support
While DBS for AN is an exciting and novel treatment develop-
ment, we have noted above a number of ethical difficulties, which 
may be encountered. The enthusiasm and potential naivety of 
researchers to this type of research should thus be tempered. This 
is best managed by creatively incorporating ethics into the heart of 
DBS research, as opposed to planning research that is sufficiently 
ethical to meet standards set by research ethics committees.
Along with the advocacy and participant liaison benefits 
of contracting an independent researcher(s) to the study, this 
demands that the researchers explain and justify any decisions 
to the external ethicist/clinician. This need to explain decisions 
allows a point of reflection and means the researchers have to 
be accountable on an everyday basis, in addition to their general 
accountability to the research governance processes. By integrat-
ing the ethicist in discussions about decisions, the researchers 
open themselves to the vulnerability of contemplating the respon-
sibilities they bear and the ramification of these responsibilities.
Reflection can also be achieved by following the example of 
the Oxford Neuroethics Research paradigm, which incorporates 
an ethics sub-study component into the protocol. This allows 
researchers, through exploring the ethical issues with the 
participants and capturing their experiences and narratives, to 
contribute empirical data to advance the field of research ethics 
within the area of DBS treatment.
Consider Future Public interest in Equity 
of access to the Products of any 
innovation arising from the research
Even if the research is at this preliminary stage, it is important to 
consider future considerations of equity if there are products of 
the research innovation.
The principle of justice in relation to DBS research is little 
discussed (63). However, equity of access is a major problem in 
DBS for SE-AN. As a highly speculative, expensive, and specialist 
treatment, it is currently only available within research trials, 
based in a limited number of neurosurgical specialist centers. 
These trials are highly limited in numbers due to the difficulty in 
funding such research. Arguably, this may be no different to the 
issue of potential participation in a trial of any new intervention, 
which is always dependent on the serendipity of being a patient of 
a recruitment center, or living in the recruitment area. However, 
this inequity is likely to continue even if DBS for SE-AN acquires 
the evidence base to become a standard treatment, because it 
is unlikely that countries or regions that lack the requisite high 
levels of health-care funding or specialist neurosurgical expertise 
would be able to offer it routinely. It has been recommended that 
country of origin, along with many other factors, should not 
affect whether a novel neurosurgical treatment is offered (8)—but 
implementing this in practice is challenging.
The potential for participants to pay for their own DBS treat-
ment within the trials or in the future also raises questions of 
equity. Such self-funding may be less unacceptable or exceptional 
in the context of a privately funded health-care system, where 
patients and the public accept the concept of accessing treatments 
according to personal wealth. However, this may be deemed more 
unacceptable in a health-care system where other treatments are 
publicly funded and free at the point of delivery—and therefore 
considered an individual’s right—such as in the UK.
COnClUSiOn
We have presented an innovative neuroethical framework applied 
to DBS research in SE-AN to guide both research ethics commit-
tees and researchers in neurotechnologies applied to vulnerable 
psychiatric populations. Critically, this framework should always 
be applied to research in SE-AN, due to the special concerns it 
merits in relation to physical health and capacity. It incorporates 
ethical gold standards in synergy with a means of empirically 
investigating the ethics of such research. We suggest that this 
method of incorporating ethics into the heart of novel neurotech-
nology research ensures that rigorous day-to-day ethical input is 
available within such sensitive and difficult research, and the wel-
fare of such vulnerable participants is maximally protected. We 
also believe that it exemplifies the Nuffield Council of Bioethics’ 
recommendations regarding the ethics of novel neurotechnology 
(2013) (53). The practical ethical issues that arise in this sort of 
research are as yet not fully investigated, and it is our hope that 
this research can not only extend the boundaries of DBS science 
but also contribute to the field of ethics of research.
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